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INTRODUCTION

In December, 1992, the PEB Study Committee ("Committee") issued its Report ("Report"). 1 The Report follows more than two and

* The a uth ors are, respectively, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of
Law, a nd Professor of La w, University of P ennsylva nia Law School. They served as Reporters for the P ermanent Editori a l B oard UC C Article 9 Study Committee and have
been appoin ted as R eporters fo r th e Dra fting Committee to R evise UCC Article 9. The
views expressed in this pa per are not necessa rily those of the Study Committee, the Perma nent Edi t oria l Board , the Am erica n L aw Institute or the N a ti on a l Conference of
Commissioners on Unifo rm Sta te L aws. R efe rences t o § X -XXX are t o the 1990 official
te xt of th e U niform Comm ercial Cod e.
1. PERMA NENT EDITORI AL BOARD FOR THE UN IFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
G ROUP UNIF ORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTI CLE 9 REPORT (Decembe r 1, 1992) (hereinafter, REPO RT ). Fo r b ackground on t he Committee, including its orga ni zation and methodology,

4
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one-half years of work by the Committee. Its principal recommendation calls for the creation of a drafting committee ("Drafting Committee") for the revision of Article 9. In addition, the Report contains
many specific recommendations for the revision of Article 9 and many
other recommendations that identify problems to which the Drafting
Committee 2 should give serious consideration.
Although the Report covers many areas in detail, it does not purport to be a comprehensive catalog of all issues that the Drafting Committee should consider. The purpose of the Report is two-fold. First, it
will provide the Drafting Committee with background and guidance.
Even as to issues on which the Study Committee reached no consensus,
the Report plows much ground that will advance and facilitate the
Drafting Committee's work. Second, the Report will serve as a medium
for attracting responses from interested persons. As a result of this input, the Drafting Committee should be better informed about the
views of those who will be affected by a revision of Article 9.
In this essay we identify and explain, by way of examples, some
important themes and patterns that emerge from the Report. One of
our goals is to offer some insight into the challenges that the Drafting
Committee will face during the next few years. 3 Another is to encourage readers to provide feedback that will inform and guide the
Drafting Committee.
IL THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECURED TO UNSECURED
CREDITORS: SECURITY INTERESTS AND BANKRUPTCY
POLICY
As Grant Gilmore's magnificent narrative makes clear, the history
of the law governing security interests in personal property can be seen
as a series of judicial and legislative battles between unsecured creditors and secured parties over the ability of the former to reach property claimed by the latter. 4 Article 9 represents what many believe to

see REPORT at l-1 6. The Comm ittee's chair a nd re porters also issued an interim re port.
S ee William M. Burke, et al. , Int erim Report on th e Activities of the Article 9 Study
Committe e, 46 B us. LAw . 1883 (1991).
2. The Co uncil of the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the Executive Committee of the National Conference on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") has acted favorably
up on the Report's principal recom mendation and approved the formati on of a dr afting
committee. We expect that the first full working session of the Drafting Co mmittee will
take place during t he fall of 1993.
3. We anticipate that the ALI and NCCUS L will approve a revised Article 9 in
1996.
4. See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY chs. 1-8
( 1965).

l
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be a grand victory for secured parties. Under Article 9, debtors generally are free to secure any and all of their debts with as much or as
little of their existing and after-acquired property as they wish. The
Article's express validation of after-acquired property and future-advance clauses has made "all assets" financing commonplace and relatively inexpensive. ~ Often, very little remains unencumbered and
available for the satisfaction of unsecured claims.
In today's economy, the centuries-old conflict between secured and
unsecured creditors frequently plays itself out in bankruptcy. Under
the federal Bankruptcy Code, security interests ordinarily are valid in
bankruptcy; that is, secured parties ordinarily are entitled to recover
their collateral or its value from the bankruptcy estate. 6 Unsecured
creditors may resort to the value of the collateral only when , and to the
extent that, the value exceeds the amount of the debt that the collateral secures.
A key exception to this general rule-and one of which the Committee was acutely aware-is that security interests that are unperfected when the debtor enters bankruptcy can be avoided by the
bankruptcy trustee. 7 Upon avoidance of the security interest, the value
of the collateral will redound to the benefit of holders of unsecured
claims, including the (formerly) secured party. 8 Inasmuch as the property of a bankruptcy debtor rarely suffices to pay its debts in full , the
loss of collateral in bankruptcy usually means a substantial loss to the
secured party.
Even a perfected security interest is not necessarily immune from
avoidance in bankruptcy. Security interests that are perfected more
than ten days after they attach ordinarily can be avoided as preferences.9 Thus, a delay in perfection that has no non-bankruptcy consequences may be fatal to a security interest if the debtor enters
bankruptcy.
For many lenders, loss of a security interest in the debtor's bankruptcy is a risk that is not willingly undertaken. The debtor's potential
entry into bankruptcy drives the structure and implementation of
many secured transactions, even those with debtors whose financial

5. See U.C .C. § 9-204(1) (security agreement may provide that obligations are to be
secured by after-acquired collateral) ; id. § 9-204( 3) (obligat ions covered by security
agreement may include future advances).
6. S ee, e.g., 11 U.S.C . § 725 (1988).
7. S ee id. § 544(a)(l)(1988); U. C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). In a Chapter 11 reorganization,
the debtor in possession may exercise the avoiding powers. See 11 U.S.C. §
1107(a )(1 988).
8. S ee 11 U.S.C. §§ 550(a), 551 (1 988).
9. S ee id. § 547(b), (e).
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health appears sound. Of course, the holder of an unperfected security
interest may lose the value of its collateral in a variety of ways other
than by avoidance of its security interest in bankruptcy. For example,
the debtor may sell the collateral to a buyer who takes free of the security interest; 10 or the debtor may encumber the collateral with a
competing security interest that is entitled to priority.n But security
agreements typically contain covenants prohibiting or restricting such
sales and encumbrances, and secured parties often are willing to act on
the expectation that debtors will not violate the covenants. 12
During the past dozen years, scholars have challenged and attempted to justify the favorable treatment that both bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy law afford to security interests. 13 To a considerable extent, the key to this favorable treatment is section 9-301(1)(b), which
provides that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before it is perfected. As
a matter of both federal and state law, the bankruptcy trustee enjoys
the rights of a lien creditor and so prevails over an unperfected security interest. 14 Section 9-301(1)(b) also is a major determinant of
whether a security interest is immune from avoidance as a preference.
Whether the creation of a security interest constitutes a preference
turns in part on when the "transfer" of the security interest occurred. 15
Bankruptcy law determines the time of transfer of an interest in personal property and fixtures by reference to the rights of a non-bankruptcy lien creditor, i.e., by reference to section 9-301(1)(b)Y
Although it was aware of both the controversy raised in the academic literature and of the pivotal role that section 9-301(1)(b) plays

10. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
11. See id. § 9-312(5).
12. A covenant against sales and encumbrances is not effective to invalidate a sale
or encumbrance that occurs in violation of the covenant. See id_ § 9-311.
13. See, e.g_, F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle , 72 VA_ L. REv. 1393
(1986); Thomas H. Jackson & Alan Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory.- A
Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 987 (1985); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics.- Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact,
133 U. PA- L. REv_ 929 (1985); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt,
37 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities_· A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986); Paul M. Shupack,
Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RuTGERS L. REv. 1067 (1989); James J.
White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 4 73
(1984) .
14_ See 11 U.S_C. § 544(a)(l); U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
15. See 11 U.S.C. § S47(b)(4).
16. See id. § 547(e)_

_,
i
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in defining the trustee 's avoidance powers, the Committee did not undertake a thorough examination of the issues surrounding the appropriate balance between secured and unsecured creditors. Rather, it
acted on the premise that any revision of Article 9 should minimize the
costs attendant to the granting and enforcement of security interests.
Among these costs are the costs of perfecting a security interest. Making perfection easier and less costly to accomplish is likely to tilt the
balance between secured and unsecured creditors: the number of unperfected security interests in bankruptcy can be expected to decline
and the allocation of a debtor's property is likely to become more
favorable to secured parties.
The Committee's approach to security interests in instruments affords a prime example of the Committee's approach to perfection issues. Under current law, a security interest in "instruments" can be
perfected only by the secured party's taking possession of the instrument.17 In contrast, a security interest in most rights to payment that
is not embodied in instruments (i.e., accounts and general intangibles)
can be perfected only by filing a financing statement. 18 The Committee
recommends that Article 9 be revised to permit a secured party to perfect a security interest in instruments by filing a financing statement. 19
As the Report explains, the existing possession requirement appears to impose unnecessary costs on secured transactions in instruments.20 First, the secured party who wishes to take a particular
writing as original collateral must determine whether that writing is an
"instrument" or some other type of collateral. When the writing is a
negotiable instrument under Article 3, a secured party can classify the
collateral by examining the writing itself. But in other cases this determination may require a factual inquiry as to whether the writing is "of
a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery."21 A secured party who chooses not to make this determination, or
who is unable to reach a conclusion with the desired level of certainty,
has an incentive to incur the costs of both filing and taking possession,

17. U.C.C. § 9·304(1). Exceptions are made for (i) certifi cated sec ur ities, as to
which §§ 8-321(2) and 8-313(1) make filing ineffective as a method of perfection ; (ii)
instrum ents that are part of chattel paper , for which both filing and taking possession
are permissible means of perfection according to §§ 9-304(1) and 9-305; (iii) instruments
in which a security interest is temporarily perfected under § 9-304(4) or (5); and (iv)
instruments consisting of cash proceeds in which a security interest is automatically perfected under § 9-306(3)(b) .
18. See U.C.C. § 9·302(1).
19. REPORT , supra note 1, at 152.
20. See id. at 152-54.
21. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) .
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to pass the risk along to the debtor in the form of an increased interest
rate or higher fees and charges, or to refrain from entering into the
transaction at all. A secured party may have similar incentives when
the collateral consists of a pool of writings, not all of which are identical in form.
Second, the possession requirement means that secured parties
whose proceeds consist of instruments (e.g., a note evidencing the obligation to pay an overdue account) lose perfection in those proceeds
unless they take possession of them before the end of the ten-day period of automatic perfection in proceeds. 22 If a security interest in instruments could be perfected by filing, then the proceeds rules would
extend the automatic-perfection period in many cases.
Third, taking possession of an instrument-whether as original
collateral or as proceeds-often is more expensive than filing. The
costs are particularly high when the collateral consists of a very large
number of instruments (such as mortgage notes) that are to be collected and administered by the debtor-assignor.
At first blush, the option to perfect a security interest in instruments by filing may appear to conflict with existing commercial practice, in which those who purchase instruments (including those who
take instruments as collateral) normally take delivery of the instruments without referring to the filing system. 23 If reducing the costs of
perfection carries with it a concomitant increase in the costs of determining whether instruments are encumbered, there is little apparent
advantage to the rule. The Committee's recommendations take these
considerations into account. If adopted, they would have the effect of
subordinating a security interest perfected by filing to the rights of
holders in due course and many other subsequent purchasers (including secured parties) who take delivery of the instrument. 24 Yet a security interest perfected by a timely filing would not be avoidable by the
debtor's bankruptcy trustee.
Several of the Committee's other recommendations would extend
the current distinction between perfection, which enables a security interest to remain valid in bankruptcy, and priority over other competing
claimants (e .g., buyers and secured parties), for which perfection usually is necessary but may not be sufficient. For example, the Committee recommends that filing become a permissive means of perfecting a

22. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3) . If, however, the proceeds are cash proceeds (e.g., a
check), then taking possession is not necessary to continued perfection. See id.
23. Official comme nt l to § 9-304 refers to the "universal practice for the secured
party to take possession of [instruments] in pledge."
24. See REPORT, supra note l, at 154-55.
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security interest in a letter of credit, but that a security interest perfected by filing be subordinated to certain subsequent security interests perfected by notification and acknowledgment. 25 Likewise, the
Committee recommends revision of the rules governing security interests in investment securities, now found primarily in Article 8, to permit perfection of security interests by filing; however, any security
interest so perfected would be subordinate to a variety of other competing claims, even though they arise subsequently. 26 The Committee's
recommendations on security interests in intellectual property subject
to federal law take the same approach. They contemplate that perfection (i.e., priority over the bankruptcy trustee) be achieved either by
filing in accordance with Article 9 (i.e., in the UCC records) or by recording in a proposed federal tract index; however, purchasers who record in the federal tract index would take priority over certain security
interests perfected only by an Article 9 filing. 27
The adoption of other recommendations would make clear that
the secured party's inability to enforce a security interest without the
use of legal process is irrelevant to its perfected status and thus to its
priority over the bankruptcy trustee. For example, the Committee is of
the view that depositary institutions should owe no obligation to secured parties holding a perfected security interest in a deposit account
unless, and then only to the extent that, the institution agrees to assume such obligations or is served with legal process concerning the
deposit account. 28 The Committee generally approved a similar approach to the duties of a financial institution maintaining a securities
account that is encumbered by a security interest. 29
Another of the Committee's recommendations invites the Drafting
Committee to consider extending this approach to non-assignable contracts, permits, and licenses. 30 Specifically, the Drafting Committee is
invited to consider revising Article 9 to provide that prohibitions on
assignment are ineffective to prevent a perfected security interest from
attaching to the debtor's rights in a contract, permit, or license , and
that the creation of a security interest in the debtor's rights does not
per se create a default notwithstanding any agreement or other law to
the contrary. The Drafting Committee's revision of Article 9 along
these lines would have important consequences if the debtor were to

25. See
26. See
27. See
in part IV.
28. See
29. See
30. See

id. at 159-61; 161-62.
id. at 163-65.
id. at 50-55. We discuss the interaction of Article 9 and federal law below
REPORT, supra note 1, at 71.
id. at 163-64.
id. at 178-80.
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enter bankruptcy. Under such a revision, a security interest could attach to property that may not be subjected to a valid security interest
under current law. If the security interest is perfected in a timely manner, then the bankruptcy trustee ordinarily would be unable to avoid
it. But the secured party would be able to realize on the collateral only
when the trustee disposes of it in accordance with the applicable contract, permit, or license. In businesses whose most valuable asset is
non-assignable (e.g., rights under a franchise agreement), a change
along these lines would enable the secured party, rather than the unsecured creditors, to capture a major portion of the value of the
business.
As the consequences of perfection are increasingly divorced from
priority and enforcement rights, one is led to the question whether
perfection should be eliminated altogether as an Article 9 concept.
This radical idea is not a new one; Professor Gilmore himself suggested
something like it more than four decades ago.31 The Reporters did not
put this question directly to the Committee; but we are confident that,
had we done so, the discussion would have been uncharacteristically
short. Our confidence is based not only on the Committee's disinclination to tamper with fundamental Article 9 concepts but also on the
belief that, when the filing system works properly, perfection serves at
least one useful purpose: It informs those who might seek to take a
security interest in particular property that the property already may
be subject to an encumbrance. 32
This justification has far less force when the competing claimant is
the debtor's bankruptcy trustee. When exercising the power to avoid
unperfected security interests, the bankruptcy trustee represents unsecured creditors who, unlike buyers and most secured parties, did not
give value in reliance on particular assets being available for satisfaction of their claims when they came due. The Committee recognized
that, as non-reliance parties, the debtor's bankruptcy trustee and unsecured creditors are situated differently from competing secured parties. Occasional suggestions were made for ways in which Article 9
might be revised to take account of these differences. These suggestions ranged from reversing the priority rule in section 9-30l(l)(b) and
providing that a judicial lien is junior to an unperfected security inter-

31. S ee 1 GRANT GILMORE, su p ra note 4, at 463-65 (describing Gilmore's suggestion
for scrapping public files and introducing appropriate safeguards t o protect those misled
by false or incomplete financial st atem ents ).
32. We discuss the Committee 's recommendations concerning the filing system below in part IV.
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est, to creating a separate federal filing system to establish security
interests in bankruptcy cases.
The Committee did not pursue these suggestions, perhaps because
of the slim likelihood that they would be enacted into law. Regardless
of the merits, it .is difficult to imagine that the political clout of the
secured lending lobby is sufficient to prompt Congress into establishing
a federal bankruptcy filing system. And even if the obverse of section
9- 30l(l)(b) could be enacted on the state level, Congress could restore
the status quo ante by amending the Bankruptcy Code to provide directly that the bankruptcy trustee can avoid unperfected security
interests. 33
The appropriate relationship between secured and unsecured creditors may present the single most important cluster of issues that the
Drafting Committee will address. We look forward to seeing how those
issues are resolved.
III.

SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9: DEALING WITH THE MARGIN

Article 9 generally has provided a sound set of rules governing attachment, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security interests in
personal property. Accordingly, the Committee paid substantial attention to whether the scope of Article 9 should be expanded to include
certain transactions and types of property currently excluded from its
scope. Part III.A. of the Report covers seven scope-related topics: (i)
sales of general intangibles and credit card receivables, 3 4 (ii) intellectual property,35 (iii) rights under insurance policies, 36 (iv) tort claims,37
(v) fixtures and real estate-related collateral,38 (vi) oil, gas, and minerals-related collateral,39 and (vii) deposit accounts. 40 The Report also

33. The Committee itself suggested some changes to the Ban kruptcy Code. Among
these are the additi on of an exception to the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code § 362 to
permit the filing of continuation statements during the bankruptcy case, see RE PORT,
supra note 1, at 137 n.10, a nd the extension of the 10-day period in Bankruptcy Code§
547(c)(3) to 20 days, to comport with proposed changes to§ § 9-301(2) and 9-312(4) . See
REPORT, supra note 1, at 103.
34. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-49.
35. See id. at 50 -55. The Committee's recommendations concerning security interests in intellectual property are discussed below in pa rt IV .
36. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 56-57.
37. See id. at 58-59.
38. See id. at 60-66.
39. See id. at 67.
40. See id. at 68-71.
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deals with other areas that raise issues of Article 9's scope. 41 The Committee relied on the work of a number of outside groups and individuals in connection with its deliberations on many scope-related issues. 42
The Committee concluded that several types of property interests
that section 9-104 now excludes from the scope of Article 9 usefully
might be brought within its scope. In the course of determining
whether to recommend the inclusion of particular types of property
within Article 9, the Committee found it necessary to distinguish
among different varieties of a particular type. For example, although
the Committee disagreed with the existing exclusion of all insurance
policies and tort claims, it recognized that security interests in some
insurance policies and tort claims probably should remain excluded. 43
In specifying which policies and claims are in and which are out of
Article 9, the Drafting Committee will face difficulties and risks of unwelcome complexity not unlike those discussed below in part V.
The difficulty of drawing a line that includes most transactions of
a particular type while excluding some transactions of that type became particularly apparent to the Committee in the context of sales of
general intangibles for the payment of money. Article 9 currently governs outright sales of accounts and chattel paper as well as security
interests in accounts and chattel paper that secure indebtedness. 44 In
contrast, Article 9 does not apply to sales of general intangibles, such
as rights to payment on unsecured loans, 45 although it does apply to
security interests in general intangibles that secure indebtedness. The
Report summarizes the problems that arise from the exclusion of sales
of all general intangibles from Article 9:
First, the transactions are governed by non-UCC law (presumably the common law dealing with the assignment of choses in
action), which may be hard to find and unclear. Second, because determining whether a transaction should be characterized as a true sale or as a secured transaction often is difficult,
parties must proceed based on alternative assumptions. Similarly, classifying certain types of property as accounts, chattel
paper, general intangibles, or instruments may be difficult.

41. See id. at 91-93 (non-UCC principles of law and equity), id. at 106-34 (proceeds), id. at 178-80 (non-assignable contracts, permits, and licenses) , id. at 181-84 (agricultural financing), id. at 194-98 (financing buyers an d non-lease bailments).
42. See id. at 13-16.
43. See id. at 56-59.
44. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37); id. § 9-102(1).
45. See id. § 9-106 cmt. ("right to receive payment of a loan not evidenced by an
instrum ent or chattel paper" is a general intangible).
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Fourth, the excluded sale transactions do not receive the benefit of the repeal of the Benedict u. Ratner doctrine . . . . Finally, and probably most important, exclusion from Article 9
excuses assignees from compliance with the public notice (filing) requirements of Article 9. 46
These concerns led the Committee to recommend that "Article 9
. be revised to include within its scope sales of general intangibles
for the payment of money." 47 To implement the Committee's recommendation, the Drafting Committee must develop a statutory definition that distinguishes general intangibles "for the payment of
money" 48 from other general intangibles. That may be easier said than
done; the Committee noted, for example, that "[v]irtually any intangible right could ... ripen into a right to payment by virtue of a breach
or default. " 49
Once the line between general intangibles for the payment of
money and other general intangibles is drawn, another problem remains. Some sales of general intangibles for the payment of money
should, in the Committee's view, remain excluded from Article 9. For
example, the application of Article 9 (and particularly its filing provisions) to the sale of loan participations 50 by financial institutions would
be particularly "obstructive." 51 The Committee's recommendations

46. REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-45 (footnotes omitted).
47. RECOMMENDATION l.A. (1st sentence), REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
48. UCC § 9-318(4) mentions, but does not define, "a general intangible for money
due or to become due."
49. REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. No one has suggested that sales of all general
intangibles (e.g., outright assignments of patents) should be brought within the scope of
Article 9. The Committee also took note of the possibility that a sale of a general intangible that is itself not one for the payment of money (such as the assignment of a patent)
could give rise to a stream of payments (i.e., royalties) that would constitute a general
intangible for the payment of money. See id. at n.10 and accompanying text.
50. As the Report explains:
Loan-participation transactions usually are structured as the sale of an undivided interest in the payments of principal, interest, and fees to be paid by a
borrower. The seller (the "lead lender" or "originator") normally continues to
pursue the collection of payments and passes on the appropriate shares of the
receipts to the participants.
REPORT, supra note 1, at 47 n.12.
51. I d. at 47. The second sentence of Recommendation l.A. reads as follows: "However, the Drafting Committee should ensure that the expanded scope does not embrace
sales of receivables as to which regulation by Article 9 would be impractical or unnecessary (e.g., loan participations and other loan sales by financial institutions and, possibly,
sales by other classes of professional lenders)." ld. at 43. The Committee appreciated
that existing Article 9 may be construed as covering some sales of loan participations,
i.e., participations in loans that are evidenced by chattel paper. It recommended that:
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leave the Drafting Committee with yet another difficult line to draw. It
might define the excluded transactions in terms of the nature of the
loan originator/participation seller as a "regulated entity," such as a
commercial bank, thrift institution, or registered broker-dealer. That
approach would create the risk that the statute would become obsolete
as the regulatory environment for financial institutions continues to
change. Or, the Drafting Committee could identify the excluded transactions on the basis of the formal structure-i.e., the sale of a participation interest. The latter approach, however, might allow form to
govern substance and permit clever lawyers to remove an unacceptably
wide variety of transactions from Article 9's reach.
However the Drafting Committee may approach a carve-out for
loan participations and the like, it should be guided by input from interested segments of the financial- services community and those who
rely on that community as a source of receivables-based financing. The
drafters must avoid disruption of current practices, preserve flexibility
for practices that may develop in the future, and be faithful to the
emerging principles of the Article 9 revisions. 52
IV. BEYOND THE STATUTORY TEXT: THE ARTICLE 9
FILING SYSTEM AND THE INTERACTION OF ARTICLE 9
WITH NON-UCC LAW
Commercial transactions are affected by many laws and regulations other than the UCC and by a variety of business practices and
patterns. ~ 3 Yet earlier UCC reform efforts have focused almost exclu-

The definition of security interest in § 1-201(37) or the scope of Article 9 specified in § 9-102(1) should be revised to provide that loan participations and
other loan sales by financial institutions (and, possibly, sales by other classes of
professional lenders) do not constitu te the sale of chattel paper that is within
the scope of Article 9.
RE CO MMENDATION 2l. C., REPORT, supra note 1, at 169 .
52. It remains to be seen whether the Drafting Commi ttee can craft a satisfactory
statutory approach for including within the scope of Article 9 some, but not all , general
intangibles for the payment of money. (This ass umes, a rguendo, that t he Drafting Committee will accept the Committee's recommendations concerning general intangibles for
the payment of money.) In another scope-related context , th e inclusion of depos it accounts as original collateral , the Study Committee was skeptical that the Drafting Committee could exclude from Article 9's coverage a subset of "transactional" or " operating"
acco unts.
53. UCC § 1-103 probably is the most important UCC provision relating to nonUCC law. That section provides: " Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equ ity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fr aud, misrepresenta tion , duress , coercion, mista ke, bankruptcy, or other valid ating or invalidating cause shall supplement
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sively on the statutory text and the official comments. That approach
is not surprising; the principal role of the UCC 's sponsors has been the
promulgation of statutory text to be presented to the states for (hopefully) unanimous adoption. Nonetheless , in several areas the Committee cast a wider net, with a view toward influencing non-UCC
developments that affect secured transactions. This part of the essay
addresses two of those areas: filing systems and federal laws that regulate interests in intellectual property. The Committee also considered
the large volume of agriculture-related secured financing that is governed not by Article 9 but by non-UCC statutory liens. The final section of this part addresses the Committee 's recommendations
concerning the relationship between Article 9 and those liens.
The issues considered in this part also illustrate the enormous assistance that the Committee received from a number of groups and
individuals. No doubt the Drafting Committee will require and receive
similar assistance on a continuing basis.5 4
A.

Article 9 Filing Systems

The provisions for giving public notice of (i.e., perfecting) a nonpossessory security interest by filing a financing statement and the
subordination of an unperfected security interest to lien creditors and
most purchasers are central components of the Article 9 scheme. The
scheme contemplates that interested third parties can search the public records to discover whether any financing statements have been
filed against a debtor's name and, if so, the nature of the collateral
covered by the financing statement.M But Article 9 has precious little
to say about how information in a filing system is to be made available
to interested persons. Section 9-403( 4) requires a filing officer to record
on a financing statement a filing number and the date and time of filing and to index a financing statement according to the debtor's
name. 56 Only in an optional provision, section 9-407 (2), does Article 9
require that the filing officer make information in the records available

its provisions." Although the Committee noted in the Rep ort several examples of improper judicial applications of § 1-1 03, the Committee recommended tha t "Article 9
should not be revis ed t o add ress explicitly the circumstances under which non-U CC
principles of law and equity should override otherwise applicable Article 9 priority
rules.'" RECOMMENDATION 12, REPORT, supra note 1, at 91.
54. See, e.g., RE CO MMENDATION 24 .D., REPORT, supra note 1, at 181 (encouraging
Drafting Committee t o work with ABA task forces conce rnin g agricultural finan cing
issues).
55. See U.C.C. § 9-402 (formal requi sites of a financing statement ).
56. Jd. § 9-403(4).
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to the public. 57 It seems that the drafters of Article 9 assumed that
filing officers would, as a matter of course, make information concerning filings available to those who wished to search. ~
Several years ago the Article 9 Filing System Task Force~ undertook a study of the UCC filing systems. At the request of, and in cooperation with, the Study Committee, the task force issued a report
("Filing Report") to the Study Committee that documented and detailed a host of deficiencies in the filing systems in various jurisdictions. 60 The Filing Report demonstrates that the drafters' assumption
was only partially correct. Although all UCC filing offices have procedures for searching for financing statements filed against a particular
debtor's name, in many jurisdictions substantial delays occur between
the time of a search request and the time that a filing officer responds;
and often the responses, when received, are not current.
The Filing Report prompted the Study Committee to encourage
the formation of another task force-one that would include representatives of filing offices and technical experts, as well as law practitioners
and academics-to study and make concrete recommendations concerning the systemic problems in the Article 9 filing systems. 61 This
task force has been organized and now is working under the sponsorship of the UCC Committee of NCCUSL. In Recommendation ll.A.,
the Committee urged the UCC's sponsors to address these systemic
problems and to "support the ongoing efforts to improve and make
more uniform the various state systems for filing . . . and conducting
searches .... " 62 The success of the new task force and the shape of its
ultimate product are difficult to predict. However, we are heartened by
8

9

57. Id. § 9-407(2) (filing officer required to provide certificate concerning financing
statement filings against a particular debtor); see also id. § 9-403 (continuation statements and filing fees for financing statements and continuation statements); id. § 9-404
(termination statements, duties of filing officer, and related fees); id. § 9-405 (assignments, duties of filing officer, and related fees); id. § 9-406 (releases of collateral, duties
of filing officer, and related fees).
58. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-403, cmt. 2 (discussing effect of continuation statement
rules on "a person searching the files").
59. The task force was organized under the auspices of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law , Uniform Commercial Code Committee, Subcommittee on
Secured Transactions.
60. REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE ARTICLE 9 FILING SYSTEM TASK
FORCE TO THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD'S ARTICLE 9 STUDY COMMITTEE (May l,
1991).
61. The Committee recognized that the systemic problems stem in part from political, finan cial, and techni cal considerations and that neither the Committee nor the
Drafting Committee would be well-suited to address them.
62. RECO MMENDATION ll.A., REPORT, supra note 1, at 88.
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the reluctance of the current group of UCC law reformers to shy away
from goals that are more ambitious than revisions to statutory text. 63
B.

Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property

The Committee also reached beyond the UCC text and commentary by considering federal law governing intellectual property, such as
copyrights, trademarks, and patents. The Committee made specific
recommendations for the revision of both federal and state law as they
relate to the perfection and priority of security interests in intellectual
property. 64 In this connection, the Committee received valuable assistance from the Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property of the ABA Section of Business Law, which submitted a report for
the Committee's consideration. 66
Given the detail and complexity of the substance of the task
force's report and the Committee's recommendations, it is not feasible
to discuss them here . Suffice it to note that the Committee is recommending that federal law and Article 9 be revised to the end that the
perfection and priority of security interests in federally regulated intellectual property would be governed, for the most part, by state law
(i.e., Article 9). The Committee recommends that an exception to this
general proposition be made for interests that are recorded in the federal records by identification of a specific item of intellectual property.
Under this exception, those recorded interests would be perfected and
would be senior to security interests that were earlier perfected by filing under Article 9 unless the secured party also had filed a "notice
filing" in the federal records .
Were federal law revised to comport with the Committee's recommendations, revision of Article 9 also would be advisable. For example,
section 9-104(a) excludes from Article 9 "a security interest subject to
any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions
in particular types of property." 66 That provision essentially states the
obvious: Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law controls. In the
Committee's view, however, section 9-104(a) should be clarified to

63. Of course, the fact remains that numerous problems relating to filing could be
addressed by changes to the text of Article 9. See RECOMMENDATION 11.8., REPORT, supra
note 1, at 89 (identifying twenty-two such problems that the Drafting Committee may
wish to address).
64. See RECOMMENDATIONS 2.A. - F. , REPORT, supra note 1, at 50-51.
65. See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ABA TAsK FoRCE ON SECURITY I NTE RESTS IN
INTELLE CTUAL PROPERTY ( 1992).
66. U.C.C. § 9-104( a) .
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make clear that state law controls except to the extent the United
States Constitution requires otherwise. 67
C.

Agricultural Statutory Liens

The Committee studied a host of issues affecting agricultural financing. Two task forces of the ABA Section of Business Law, Committee on Commercial Financial Services, Subcommittee on
Agricultural and Agri-Business Financing-the Article 9 Task Force
and the Task Force on Statutory Liens-presented most of these issues
to the Committee. These task forces prepared two reports for the Committee's consideration, 68 and task force members met with the Committee on two occasions. The Final Report of the task forces contained
several important recommendations; the Committee recommended
that the Drafting Committee give these recommendations serious
consideration. 69
The task forces' most novel and far-reaching recommendation concerns the burgeoning number of agricultural statutory liens. Even
within a given state, the law governing these liens often differs greatly
with respect to creation of the lien, priority over competing claims to
property subject to the lien (including whether any public-notice step
is required for priority), and methods of enforcement. Under the task
forces' recommendation, which the Committee generally supported, 70
the perfection, priority, and enforcement rules of Article 9 would be
extended to agricultural statutory liens. 71 If successful, this approach

67. See Committee RECOMMENDATION 2.A., REPORT, supra note 1, at 50; id. at 52
n.4 . The Committee also recommends clarification of § 9-302(3)(a), which excludes from
the Article 9 filing requirements security interests covered by federal laws that provide
for certificates of title or a special place of filing.
68. See REPORT ON AGRICULTURAL FINANCING UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (1991); FINAL REPORT ON AGRICULTURAL FINANCING UNDER ARTICLE 9
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1992).
69. REPORT, supra note 1, at 181.
70. !d.
71. Under the recommendation, Article 9 would not affect the creation (attachment) of agricultural statutory liens or determine the property to which they attach.
These issues would continue to be determined by the non-UCC law of each state.
The current Article 9 deals with statutory liens only to a very limited extent, as
follows:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods
in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is
statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
§ 9-310.

u.c.c.
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could be used to regularize the treatment of a vast array of other nonUCC liens. 72
In recommending that the Drafting Committee consider addressing agricultural statutory liens through revisions to the text of Article 9
itself, rather than through changes to non-UCC law, the Committee's
recommendation differs somewhat from the approach it favored in connection with filing systems and federal law regulating intellectual property. But the differences should not be overemphasized. Of greater
significance is the fact that in each case the Committee demonstrated
its willingness to confront and to deal with non-UCC law.
V.

CRAFTING THE STATUTORY RULES: FINE LINES AND
ROUGH JUSTICE

One of the virtues of Article 9 is that most of its provisions are
readily accessible to lawyers who are familiar with its general outlines.
In revising Article 9, the Drafting Committee will be expected not only
to determine questions of Article 9's policy and scope, but also to embody its choices in statutory language that preserves its accessibility.
We have all heard that hard cases make bad law. This aphorism
reflects two sometimes competing goals of the legal system. As a general matter, the system benefits from rules whose applicability and application are certain and that generate predictable results. Commercial
law, which usually concerns financial rather than moral values, serves
not only to resolve disputes after they occur but also to guide parties in
planning and structuring their transactions. As a result, one often
hears a clamoring for certainty from those whose conduct is governed
by commercial law. This demand for certainty sometimes is so strong
that it evokes another aphorism: the content of the rule is irrelevant,
as long as the rule is certain.
But even in commercial law, among commercial parties, the results
yielded by otherwise desirable legal rules may be seen as inappropriate
or unfair in particular cases. A perception that the legal system effectuates injustice tends to undermine the respect for law. Insofar as those
who draft statutes are able to foresee circumstances under which a special rule (or an exception) should substitute for the general rule, they
can limit the general rule accordingly. Precision is not without its
costs, however . As special rules multiply, the law becomes more complicated; with complexity comes an increased likelihood that those who
rely upon the law will find it increasingly difficult to find, comprehend,

72 . See REPORT , supra note l , at 181 (recommending that the Drafting Committee
seriously cons ider approaching non-agricultural statutory liens in a manner similar to the
approach suggested for agricultural liens) .

578

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

and apply. In some cases, the cure may be worse than the disease. Suffering injustice in a limited number of cases may be preferable to confronting a bewildering array of rules in every case. And, in the extreme,
a complex of rules may be so impenetrable that, ironically, litigation
becomes unpredictable.
As experience under Article 9 grows, so do the cases for which its
users perceive a need for special rules to govern apparently unforeseen
circumstances. The Drafting Committee is likely to face a number of
situations in which it must decide whether to fashion a complex statutory rule that resolves each imaginable case with something close to
perfection or a simpler rule that can be expected to yield less than
optimum results in a number of cases. The Study Committee experienced this tension periodically. Nowhere was the tension more evident
than in the Committee's deliberations concerning the effect of a change
in business structure on security interests in property acquired after
the change.
The 1962 Official Text contained no provisions directly addressing
the Article 9 consequences of the incorporation of a debtor-proprietorship, the merger of a debtor-corporation, or similar changes in business
structure. The 1972 amendments to Article 9 addressed at least some
of these problems in a new section 9-402(7). The second sentence governs changes of name and organizational structure. The third sentence
governs transfers of collateral. As applied to the simplest situations-the change of a debtor's name and the sale of collateral without
the secured party's authorization-the rules give clear albeit not uncontroversial answers. The application of these sections to other common but more complex facts, e.g. , a sole proprietor incorporates the
business and transfers the inventory-collateral to the new corporation,
or a corporate debtor whose inventory is subject to a security interest
merges into another corporation whose inventory secures a debt to another lender, has posed considerable difficulty for commentators as
well as courts.
The problems that transactions of this kind otherwise might generate often are solved by good lawyering. The attorney who advises the
sole proprietor concerning incorporation should check to see whether
the incorporation would violate the credit agreement with the secured
party; if (as is likely) it would, then the attorney would advise the client to reach an understanding with the secured party before proceeding to incorporate. Similarly, a corporate merger is likely to constitute
a default by the non-surviving corporation, if not also by the survivor.
Adept attorneys for both debtors would discover this fact before the
merger and take steps to insure that all necessary consents were obtained. For secured creditors of the non-survivor, these steps might include seeking to obtain from the survivor appropriate documentation,
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including a security agreement and financing statement. This would set
into motion the process of determining the relative rights of the parties. If Article 9 were unclear on this point (which it is), then the parties either would establish their relative priorities by agreement, agree
to defer the contest without resolving it, or refuse to consummate the
merger.
Reported cases suggest that these issues do arise with some frequency and that the courts have not resolved them in a consistent
fashion. 73 As for the "right" answer , each side can make a case. Some
observers believe that a secured party should not be deprived of a firstpriority security interest in after-acquired property because its debtor
incorporated or merged, particularly if the incorporation or merger violated the security agreement and transpired without the knowledge of
the secured party. On the other hand, some argue that Article 9 should
not impose upon the lender to the new or surviving corporation the
risk that property acquired by its own debtor (other than as a result of
the incorporation or merger) may be subject to security interests
neither granted by nor filed against that debtor.
The Committee recommendations reflect the divergence of views
on this issue. 74 One group favored a rule that would reflect the distinction that non-UCC law draws among different legal persons (e.g., the
sole proprietor and the corporation; the non-survivor and the survivor) .
This group would impose the risk that a different person continues the
debtor's business on the secured party whose debtor no longer operates
the business (or, in the case of a corporate merger, no longer exists).
They would revise Article 9 to provide that the security agreement and
financing statement do not bind and are not effective against a person
who did not sign them, except to the extent that a non- UCC statute or
rule of law (e.g., the applicable state corporation law) provides otherwise. In many cases, a rule of this kind would require the secured party
of the sole proprietor or of the non-surviving corporation to obtain a
new security agreement and financing statement from the entity that
continues the business.
The other group would give the secured party a grace period, during which a security interest in collateral acquired by the entity continuing the business would be perfected if it would have been perfected
had the collateral been acquired by the original debtor. That is, the
latter group would make a financing statement naming the original
debtor (sole proprietor or non-surviving corporation) effective with re-

73. See , e.g., In re Scott, 113 B.R. 516, 520- 26 (Bankr. W.D . Ark . 1990) (citing
cases ).
74. See REPORT , su p ra note 1, at 143-45.
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spect to collateral acquired by a successor entity within four months of
the change, even if the successor had a completely different name and
did not sign the statement. 75
The arguments in favor of each position are set forth in the Report, and the Drafting Committee can be expected to debate the issue
at length. If it concludes that the second view gives better results, then
the Drafting Committee will confront the question whether the complications attendant to effectuating the second view override the concern
for more perfect justice. Adoption of the second view would require
drawing a statutory line between those business changes for which
overriding the generally applicable distinction among separate legal
persons might be appropriate (e .g., the incorporation of a proprietorship) and those for which it would be inappropriate (e.g., the sale of
business assets to a competitor).
In addition, as the Report explains in greater detail, adoption of
the second view would require the promulgation of special priority
rules to govern competing security interests in property acquired after
the change in structure. The priority rule that the Committee suggested is not a simple one: For purposes of the first-to-file-or-perfect
rule of section 9-312(5), a financing statement filed against one debtor
(e.g., a non-surviving corporation) that becomes effective against another debtor (the survivor) would date, for purposes of determining
priority against a competing secured creditor of the other debtor, not
from the time of its filing against the non-survivor but from the time
the survivor became bound by the non-survivor's security agreement
(generally, the effective date of the merger). 76
When confronted with the choice between drawing fine, but complex, lines and effectuating rough justice, on this issue and numerous
others , the Drafting Committee does have a third option. It can eschew
the task of writing rules and leave the issue to the courts, with a statutory standard or two for guidance. Our experience with recent revisions
to the UCC leads us to predict with supreme confidence that the tradition of seeking at least a modest degree of certainty will continue and
that the Drafting Committee will not choose this third approach.
VI.

CONCLUSION

We close this paper as we began. We call on those who are interested in Article 9 to share with the Drafting Committee their reactions
to the Committee's recommendations and any other views that might

75. The original financing statem ent would remain effective until lapse if it is not
se riously misl eading with respect to the successor.
76. See REPORT , supra note 1, at 146-48.
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be of assistance in the draft ing process. And we remind the various
constituencies of Article 9 that the immensity and range of the Article
9 revision project will demand your attention, your involvement, and,
not in the least, your sense of humor.

